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ELLERMAN V. CHICAGO JUNCTION RAILWAYS AND UNION
STOCKYARDS CO. ET AL.' NEW JERSEY
COURT OF CHANCERY.
Directors' Discretion in Corporate Acts-Right of Stockholder to
Question.
Where a bill was brought against the Chicago Junction Railways
and Union Stockyards Company by the stockholders of the same, to en-
join the compan.y from carrying into effect a certain agreement deemed
by the stockholders to be beyond the authority of the directors thereof,
held, that individual stockholders could not question, in judicial pro-
ceedings, the Iborporate acts of directors, if the same are within the
powers of the corporation, and in furtherance of its purposes, are not
unlawful or against good morals, and are done in good faith and'in the
exercise of an honest judgment:
Decided December 18, 1892.
TIlE RIGHT OF STOCKHOLDERS TO CONTROL THE DIscRETION OF
DIREcToRs IN CORPORATE AcTs.
As a general rule the courts will
presume that contracts entered into
by a corporation, which appear to
be designed to promote its legiti-
mate and profitable operation, are
within the limits of its powers, and
if their validity be assailed, will
require the assailant to assume the
burden of demonstrating that fact.
Questions of policy, of manage-
ment, of expediency, of contracts
or action, of adequacy of consider-
ation not grossly disproportionate,
of lawful appropriation of corpo-
rate funds to advance corporate
interests-are left solely to the hon-
est decision of the directors, if
I Reported in 49 N. J. Eq., 217.
their powers arewithout limitation
and free from restraint. Any other
view would substitute the judg-
ment and discretion of others in
the place of those determined on
in the formation of the corpora-
tion: Park v. Grant Locomotive
Works, 40 N.J. Eq., 114; 10 Am.
& Eng. Corp. Cas., affirmed, 45 N.
J. Eq., 244; Elkins v. Camden &
A. R. R. Co., .36 N.J. Eq;, 241; 1;
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas., 579; Rut-
land & B. R. Co. v. Proctor, 29 Vt.,
93; Mor. Priv. Corp., 243; Beach,
Corp., p. 388.
In his opinion in the case of .El-
lerman v. Chicago J. R. & U. S.
1164- TIE RIGHT OFSTOCKHOLDERS TO CONTROL THE
Co., GR.UE, V. C., says: "The
question of. adequacy df the con-
sideration received by the company
for what it. agreed to pay is one
* which is not open to the plaintiff.
So long as the consideration was
valuable, and not so inadequate as
to impute fraud, the amount to be
paid -was in the discretion of the
board of directors, and will not be
inquired into by the court. ....
The terms of the contract and the
consideration having, then, been
settled by the directors, on what
ground is it attacked? There is
no intimation of fraud. No im-
providence is alleged; no extrava-
gance; no absence of occasion
moving such a contract; no alle-
gation. of haste or of mistake of
, facts. Nothing is alleged but error
of law on the part of the directors
who unanimously approved the
agreement."
Chancellor GaEEN then goes on
to show that the legal presumption
is in favor of the agreement, and
that the burden lies upon the com-
plainant to demonstrate that the
agreement was beyond the corpo-
rate powers, and to show how and
where the legal restraint arises or
was imposed which rendered the
contract ultra vires. See Wood on
Railway Law, p. 526; also Shrews-
bury, etc. R. Co. v. Northwestern
R. Co., H. L. Cas., 113. ,
After a further examination into
the nature of the proposed agree-
ment, and into the powers with
which the corporation was invested
by its charter, Chancellor GREEN
concludes: "In my opinion the
covenants entered into by the com-
pany in this contract are "referable
to the objects stated in their certifi-
cate of corporation, or to powers
incident to the corporation, and are
authorized by its charter. . .
And I advise that the bill be dis"
missed with costs."
In such, cases the court will not
interfere unless, as JAMES, L. J.,
said, in Macdougall v. Gardiner,
L. R., I Ch. Div., 13, "there be
something illegal, oppressive, or
fraudulent-unless there is some-
thing ultra vires on the part of the
company qud company, or on the
part of the majority of the com-
pany, so that they are not fit per-
sons to determine it." InDodge v.,
Woolsey, iS How. (U. S.), 331,
where the directors of a bank re-
fused to take the proper measures
to resist the collection of a tax,
which they themselves believed to
have been imposed-upon them in
violation of their charter, this re-
fusal amounted to a breach of trust,
and a stockholder-was held compe-
tent to file abill in chancery asking
such remedy as the case might
require.
The directors of a corporation
are, however, as to all purposed of
dealing with others, the corpora-
tion itself, and when convened as a
board they are the primary posses-
sors of all the powers possessed by
the corporation. What they do as
the representatives of the corpora-
tion the corporation itselfis deemed
to do: Hoyt v. Thompson, i N.Y.,
207; Burrill v. Nehant Bank, 2
Metc. (Mass.), 163; Star Line v.
Van Vliet, 43 Mich., 364; Genessee
Say. Bank v. Michigan Barge Co.
52 Mich., 438; 6 Amer. & Eng. Corp.
Cas., 253; Cleveland & M. R. Co.
v. Himrod Furnace Co., 37 Ohio
St., 321.
It follows from this that the
stockholders of a corporation have
no right to control or interfere with
the management of the business
and the concerns of the company
by the directors. The authority of
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the board of directors is derived
from the unanimous agreement of
the stockholders expressed in their
charter or articles of association,
and hence these powers which it is
intended shall belong to the direc-
tors exclusively, cannot be impaired
by the shareholders: Tuscaloosa
Manufacturing Co. v. Cox, 68 Ala.,
71; Perry v. Tuscaloosa Cotton Seed
Oil Mill Co. (Ala.), 33 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cas., 346; Sims v. Brooklyn
Street R. Co., 37 Ohio St., 556;
Pratt v. Pratt, 33 Conn , 446.
This is well settled, therefore,
that the board of directors of a cor-
poration cannot be controlled in
the exercise of the discretionary
powers conferred upon them; the
courts will not interfere at tlje suit
of a shareholder to redress an al-
leged injury suffered by the corpo-
ration through some act of the
directors, performed in good faith,
and within the scope of their pow-
ers. All questions of expediehcy
and economy, within the limits of
their powers, must be left to the
free exercise of their judgment, and
remedy cannot be had by applica-
tion to the courts.
In Dudley v. Kentucky High
School, 9 Bush. (Ky.), 576, the cor-
poration was authorized by its char-
ter "to receive and hold for the
benefit of a high school any lands,
by gift, devise, donation, contract,
or purchase." A stockholder
brought suit to enjoin a contem-
plated purchase of real estate, set-
ting out that the corporation was
unable to pay the contemplated
price, and that the result of the
purchase, if consummated, would
be the bankruptcy of the corpora-
tion, but did not allege that the
lands were not to be held for the
benefit of the school. It was held
that the petition did not show a
cause of action. The Court said:
"The corporation's charterempow-
ers it to make purchases of land, to
contract debts, and to issue bonds
to a certain amount; and if these
powers are so exercised as to result
in loss to the stockholders, it is
a misfortune against which the
courts can afford no protection."
See, also, Boyd v. Sims, 87 Tenn.,
771; Ogelsby v. Attril, 1o5 U. S.-
605; Banet v. Alton & S. R. Co., 13
Ill., 5o4; Bardstown & G. R. Turn-
pike Co. v. Rodman (Ky.), 13 S.W.
Rep., 918.
The rule that the court will not
interfere in questions of expedi-
ency or economy has been applied
in actions by stockholders to pre-
vent the directors of a manufactur-
ing corporation from using a large
surplus for the erection of an addi-
tional factory, andto compel them to
distribute it among the stockhold-
ers: Pratt v. Pratt, Read & Co., 33
Conn., 446 ; to an action to set aside
certain subscriptions for a portion
of the authorized capital of the com-
pany taken by the directors: Sims
v. Brooklyn Street R. Co., 37 Ohio
St., 556; 4 Am. and Eng. R. Cas.,
132; and to an action by stock-
holders of a railroad company to
prevent the extension of the rail-
road, and to prevent the directors
from using the corporate assets
therefor: Moses v. Thompkins, 84
Ala., 613; 21 Am. and Eng. Corp.
Cas., 634.
The courts will not inquire as to
the wisdom ofan assessment, or its
necessity at the time, or the mo-
tives which prompted it, if it be
.within the legitimate authority of
the directors to levy it, and the ob-
jects for which the company waz
incorporated will justify the ex-
penditure of the money to be raised.
Directors of a turnpike company,
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being authorized by statute to re-
move any.of the gates'oof the com-
pany when it will be for the interest
of the road, cannot, as long as they
* act. in good faith, be restrained at
thle suit of the stockholders from
,exercisingtbis power and the power
to sell the abandoned toll houses:
Bardstown & G. R. T. Co. v. Rod-
man (Ky.), i 3 S. W. Rep., 917.
On account of the vast increase in
the number of corporations and the
purposes-for which they are fdrmed
in this country, and the' necessity
for the exercise by their officers
arid managing boards of wide dis-
cretionary powers, courts of the
present period incline to deal with
them very liberally, both in con-
struing their express, and in grant-
ing their implied, authority. In
oing so, they have to a certain ex-
tent relaxed the former rule on
this subject. At an earlier period.
they were reluctant to concede
powers to the directors beyond a,
strict construction of the charter
and by-laws: Whitewell v. Baruer,
20 Vt., 425; see also, Augusta
Bank v. Hamblett, 35 Me., 491;
Dispatch Line, etc., 'v. 'Bellamy
Mfg. Co., 12 N. H., 225.
When acting as a board within
the scope of their authority, how-
ever conferred, their acts are bind-
ing on the corporation, and all its
legitimate business may be trans-
acted-by them without the express
sanction of the stockholders. The
latter have no right to interfere
with management by the board.
Courts will not, even on the peti-
tion of a majority, compel the
directors to do an act contrary to
their judgment. It is within the
province of the board to declare
dividends, for example, and it re-
quires a strong case to -induce
courts to interfere with the exer-
cise of its discretion in that matter,
in the absence of an improper or
corrupt motive: State v. Bank of
La., 6 La., 745.
In Small v. Minneapolis Electro
Matrix Co., 45 Minn., 264, the
Court said: "In the absence of ex-
press provision to the contrary, it
is to be considered as the law con-
cerning business corporations that
their affairs are to be managed in
the interest of their stockholders,
and by directors or agents ap-
pointed by them. This is to be
taken to be implied in the contract
unless in some manner a different
intentionis expressed."
As to the right to impair the
discretionary power of directors,
Morawetz says, in 243: "The
managing agents of ordinary pri-
vate corporations are invested with
wide discretionary powers; if this
were not so it would be impossible
to carry on the business of such
companies successfully. So long
as the agents of a company act
honestly within the powers con-
ferred upon them by the charter,
they cannot be controlled. The
individual shareholders have no
authority to dictate to the com-
pany's agents what policy they
shall pursue, or to impair that dis-
cretion which was conferred upon
them by the charter. If- share-
holders are dissatisfied with their
agents, whom they have elected,
their remedy is to elect other
agents. It would be a violation of
the charter contract and a wrong
to every dissenting member to per-
mit any portion of the shareholders
to interfere with the discretionary
powers which were intrusted to the
agents of the corporation alone.
"It may, therefore, be stated as a
rule that no shareholder can inter-
fere with the management of the
